REFORMING THE STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
The snag is that it might mean that the more a fraudster revealed, the safer he would be. The prosecution would then be driven to find evidence 'independent' (the term used in the Istel case) of his statements. This however might be purely circumstantial and even consistent with an innocent explanation, allowing a successful submission; and even if sufficient for a prima facie case, the accused would have the tactical advantage of opening a well-planned defence to the jury not previously foreshadowed and disarmed by prosecution evidence of his statements. But it is difficult to see what other compromise, short of restoring the privilege entirely, is feasible.
Will defence disclosure now called for under the Criminal Procedure (Investigations)
Act 1996 fill the gap? In exchange for disclosure by the prosecution of all its relevant material, an accused is supposed to give written notice of his defence, specifying what he disputes in the prosecution case, and why. These defence statements will presumably be put in by the prosecution and any departure from them at the trial will bring down on the o accused the inevitable comments and inferences. Even so, this falls far short of the compulsive regime of the companies (and other) legislation. Moreover it presupposes that the authorities have enough detailed knowledge of an accused's conduct to require him to provide answers in the same detail. While this will often be true in the more witnessable crimes, it is much less likely in the typical fraudster's machinations; hence the need for compulsion in the first place. There is also a section on Ancillary Acts which contains other statutes and extracts of statutes of relevance to the student and lawyer.
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